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Comment
Everything You Wanted to Know
About Missouri's Public Policy
Exception But Didn't Know
You Should Ask
I. INTRODUCTION

In a wrongful discharge action based on the public policy exception to
the employment-at-will doctrine courts created a sleeper claim favoring
terminated at will employees.' Much to the chagrin of Missouri employers,
that sleeper claim is winning more and more frequently in Missouri courts.
Generally, Missouri courts categorically constrain the public policy exception
in a narrow and clearcut fashion. However, some Missouri courts pushed and
rubbed at the bright lines of those categories and created a hazy area of
unpredictability in the exception. In addition, federal courts interpreting the
Missouri public policy exception introduced a significant pre-emption dispute
which Missouri state courts have yet to address. To what extent has the
public policy exception eroded employment-at-will? If you take a close look,
the answer appears to be not much. But, do the courts know that?

II. EVOLUTION OF MISSOURI'S PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
The common law employment-at-will doctrine necessarily provides the
starting point for a discussion of wrongful discharge actions based on public
policy. "Employees who do not have a contract for a definite period of time
are considered 'employees-at-will'." 2 Generally, an employer can discharge
an at will employee for or without cause and not incur liability for wrongful
discharge.3 Before the emergence of the public policy exception, 4 an at will

1. For a discussion of the interface between employment-at-will and the
development of a public policy exception, see infra notes 15-19 and accompanying
text.
2. McCloskey v. Eagleton, 789 S.W.2d 518, 519 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (citing
Amaan v. City of Eureka, 615 S.W.2d 414, 415 (Mo.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084
(1981)).
3. Dake v. Tuell, 687 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Mo. 1985); see also Christy v. Petrus,
295 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Mo. 1956); Culver v. Kum, 193 S.W.2d 602, 603 (Mo. 1946);
Forsyth v. Board of Trustees of Park College, 212 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Mo. Ct. App.
1948); Bell v. Faulkner, 75 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934).
Dean Timothy Heinsz of the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law
discussed the underpinnings of the employment-at-will doctrine:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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employee could not avoid the general rule absent a statute enabling the
employee to bring a wrongful discharge action.5
With the public policy exception, ajudicial check on an employer's right
to terminate at will employees emerged. The court in Petersimes v. Crane
Company' precisely stated the foundation of the public policy exception:
While there may be a right to terminate a contract at will for no reason, or
for an arbitrary or irrational reason, there can be no right to terminate such
a contract for an unlawful reason or purpose that contravenes public policy.
A different interpretation would encourage and sanction lawlessness, which
law by its very nature is designed to discourage and prevent.7
Thus, courts in Missouri and throughout the country armed themselves with
a tool of discretion to combat another tool of discretion-the employment-atwill rule. 8 As discussed below, self-regulation necessary to prevent judges

The rule is not based on contract principles, for the employer-employee
relation is that of principal to agent. An agency is formed by consent and
it is not necessarily a contract which requires consideration. The
relationship's commencement and duration depend upon a mutual and
voluntary agreement of the parties. With few exceptions, the principal or
agent has the power to terminate the relationship, even when there is no
right to do so. Both parties are required to work in close association for the
principal's benefit and owe mutual fiduciary duties. Either should be free
to terminate the relationship at will.
Timothy J. Heinsz, The Assault on the Employment at Will Doctrine: Management

Considerations, 48 Mo. L. REV. 855 (1983). For another interpretation of the
employment-at-will foundation, see Joan M. Krauskopf, Employment Discharge:
Survey and Critique of the Modern At Will Rule, 51 UMKC L. REv. 189, 191 (1983).

4. The remainder of this Comment focuses on the public policy exception in
Missouri. For a general discussion of the emergence of the public policy exception,
see Heinsz, supra note 3, at 873-81.
5. Dake v. Tuell, 687 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Mo. 1985); see also Christy v. Petrus,
295 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Mo. 1956); Culver v. Kurn, 193 S.W.2d 602, 603 (Mo. 1946);
Forsyth v. Board of Trustees of Park College, 212 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Mo. Ct. App.
1948); Bell v. Faulkner, 75 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934).
In Missouri, for example, an employee discharged for filing a claim under a
worker's compensation statute has available a statutory wrongful discharge cause of
action. See Hansome v. Northwestern Cooperage Co., 679 S.W.2d 273, 275-76 (Mo.
1984) (interpreting Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.780 (1994).
6. 835 S.W.2d 514 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
7. Id. at 516 (quoting Sides v. Duke Univ., 328 S.E.2d 818, 826 (N.C. Ct. App.
1985)).

8. The court in Boyle v. Vista Eyewear,Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 872 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985) discussed several cases interpreting the public policy exception in other
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss4/4
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from becoming legislators tagged along with the self empowerment of the
public policy exception.
Missouri courts introduced the public policy exception concept in Smith
v. Arthur C. Baue FuneralHome. 9 In Baue, an at will employee arranged for
a union representative to negotiate and execute an agreement with his
employer." Upon learning of the arrangement, the employer terminated the
employee." The court held:
[H]is employers' right to terminate his employment at any time for any
reason ... was modified by the adoption of Section 29, Article 12 ...
namely, an employer may not discharge an employee for asserting the
constitutional right thereby given him to choose collective bargaining
representatives to bargain for him concerning his employment .... Thus,
plaintiff's discharge .. . was a wrongful discharge for which he could
maintain an action for damages. 3
Baue created the first narrowly defined exception to the Missouri employmentat-will doctrine: at will employees terminated for exercising a constitutional
right, such as appointing a union representative for collective bargaining
purposes, have available a wrongful discharge cause of action. 4
Twenty-one years after Baue, the Eastern District Court of Appeals
tinkered with creating a virtually undefinable public policy exception when an
at will employee of Barnes Hospital sued Barnes for wrongful discharge."

jurisdictions. See, e.g., Sides v. Duke University, 328 S.E.2d 818, 826-27 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1985) (interpreting North Carolina's public policy exception); Delaney v. Taco
Time Int'l, Inc., 681 P.2d 114, 118 (Or. 1984) (interpreting Oregon's public policy
exception); Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202, 1205 (8th Cir. 1984)
(interpreting Arkansas's public policy exception); Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 443
A.2d 728, 730 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (interpreting New Jersey's public
policy exception); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1335 (Cal. 1980)
(interpreting California's public policy exception); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo &
Ironton Railroad Co., 265 N.W.2d 385, 388 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (interpreting
Michigan's public policy exception).
9. 370 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. 1963).
10. Id. at 251.
11. Id.
12. Article I, section 29, of the Constitution of Missouri provides that "employees
shall have the right to organize and to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing." Mo. CONST. art. I, § 29.
13. Baue, 370 S.W.2d at 254.
14. Id.
15. Ising v. Barnes Hosp., 674 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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The plaintiff in Ising v. Barnes Hospital6 was terminated for refusing to sign
a hold-harmless agreement connected with an employer mandated polygraph
test.17 After pointing out that "public policy" invalidates agreements between
employers and employees that waive employer liability for negligently
maintaining work conditions, 8 the plaintiff argued the discharge was based
on grounds contravening public policy and, therefore, was actionable as an
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.' 9
In emphasizing its loyalty to employment-at-will, the Ising court found
a "substantial difference between a policy which voids a transaction and one
Rendering
which gives rise to an independent cause of action."2
unenforceable an agreement waiving employer liability provides a protective
shield for employees, not a sword for a wrongful discharge attack.2 The
court refused to create a boundless public policy exception.' •
After such stirring in the lower courts, the Missouri Supreme Court reentered the public policy exception fray in Dake v. Tuell.23 In Dake,
employees of Lowry Organ Center were fired for informing their employer
that salespeople at Lowry made fraudulent misrepresentations to customers.24
The employees brought prima facie tort actions against their employer on the
grounds that the "defendants had discharged plaintiffs in complete disregard

16. Id.
17. Id. at 624. Barnes insisted that all members of the respiratory department
submit to a polygraph test due to rampant criminal activity within the department. Id
Before taking the polygraph all employees were required to sign an agreement to hold
harmless Barnes and the test administrator for any negligent or intentional conduct
associated with the polygraph. Id. The plaintiff objected to the agreement, not the
polygraph. Id.
18. See Flaiz v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co., 184 S.W. 917, 919-920 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1916); Hartman v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co., 182 S.W. 148, 152 (Mo. 1916).
19. Ising, 674 S.W.2d at 624-25.
20. Id. at 625.
21. See id. The court stated that creating a sword from the public policy
rendering liability waivers unenforceable is a legislative prerogative. See id. at 625-26
(citing Murphy v. American Home Products, Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89 (N.Y. 1983)
(stating that due to the far reaching consequences of alterations to the employment-atwill doctrine, the legislature is in the best position to create such alterations)).
22. 1sing, 674 S.W.2d at 625-26.
23. 687 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. 1985).

24. Id. at 192.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss4/4
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of their state and federal constitutional rights." 25 The Dake majority held off
public policy expansion, holding:
Here, plaintiffs would have us render near impotent this long standing legal
principle-by establishing a rule that would permit an at will employee to
bring an action for wrongful discharge under the guise of the prima facie
tort doctrine. This we decline to do.26
Significantly, in concurring with the Dake majority, Judge Blackmar
challenged Missouri's conservative wrongful discharge jurisprudence.'
He
said the majority opinion contained "unnecessarily broad pronouncements"
regarding wrongful termination actions and should be "authoritative only on
the facts now before us., 28 In effect, Judge Blackmar told plaintiffs' lawyers
and lower courts pushing for expansion not to be discouraged-try again.29
Try again they did. In Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc.,3" the Missouri
Court of Appeals, Western District, used Judge Blackmar's concurring opinion
in Dake to springboard into a broad public policy exception analysis." In
Boyle, an at will employee at an eyeglass laboratory was fired after reporting
her employer to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the
Food and Drug Administration for disregarding the performance of certain
FDA mandated safety tests on eyeglasses.32 The employee brought a
wrongful discharge claim against her employer based on the public policy
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.33
In exploring the public policy exception theory the Boyle court identified
four broad categories of wrongful discharge actions based on the public policy

25. Id. Although the plaintiffs "cloak[ed] their claims in the misty shroud of
prima facie tort" in an attempt to avoid the employment-at-will doctrine that would
necessarily flow from pleading wrongful discharge claims, the court recognized the
claims were essentially wrongful discharge claims and analyzed them as such. See id.
at 192-93.
26. Id.at 193.
27. Dake, 687 S.W.2d at 194 (Blackmar, J., concurring).
28. Id.
29. See Linda Forsythe, DurationofEmployment-At-Will, 56 UMKC L. REV. 343
(1988).
30. 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
31. See id. at 870-71.
32. Id.at 870.
33. Id.The employee argued: 1) she was fired for reporting violations of laws
designed to protect the health and welfare of the general public; 2) termination on such
grounds is against public policy and is wrongful; and 3) Missouri should recognize a
valid wrongful discharge cause of action based on such facts. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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" 1) cases dealing with
exception that are generally accepted in other states:34
"employees fired because they declined to obey directions to commit a crime
or to act contrary to public policy;"3 5 2) cases involving the termination of
employees "who report wrongdoing or violations of law or public policy by
their employers or fellow employees; 3 6 3) cases that "frown[] on discharge
of an at will employee whose acts are those that sound public policy would
encourage, for example, acceptance of a call to jury duty ... asserting a right
to elect or designate collective bargaining representatives, or joining a labor
union;"37 and 4) cases "disapproving of retaliatory discharge of employees
whose only sin was the filing of a worker's compensation claim."38
After introducing such expansive public policy exception dicta into its
opinion,39 the Boyle court tailored a narrow holding, assuring affirmation and
some expansion:

[W]here an employer has discharged an at-will employee
because that employee refused to violate the law or any well

established and clear mandate of public policy as expressed in
the constitution, statutes and regulations promulgated pursuant to
statute, or because the employee reportedto his superiorsor to
public authoritiesserious misconduct that constitutes violations

of the law and of such well established and clearly mandated
public policy, the employee has a cause of action in tort for
damages for wrongful discharge.4

34. See id. at 872-75.

35. Id. at 873 (citing Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25
(Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (holding that an at will employee terminated for refusing to
commit perjury before a legislative committee has a wrongful discharge cause of
action)).
36. Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 873 (citing Brown v. Physicians Mut. Ins. Co., 679
S.W.2d 836 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984)) which held that an at will employee terminated for
reporting her employer's illegal conduct to the state insurance commission has a
wrongful discharge cause of action). Incidentally, the plaintiff in Boyle relied on this
theory. Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 876-78.
37. Id. at 875 (citing Smith v. Arthur C. Baue Funeral Home, 370 S.W.2d 249
(Mo. 1963)). For a discussion of Baue, see supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
38. Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 875 (citing Hansome v. Northwestern Cooperage Co.,
679 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. 1984) (holding that Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.780, prohibiting the
discharge of an employee for exercising worker's compensation rights, creates a
wrongful discharge cause of action in favor of such an employee)). See supra note 5
for further discussion of Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.780 (1994).
39. The aforementioned dicta regarding the four categories of public policy
exceptions created a breeding ground for confusion in this area of the law.
40. Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 878 (emphasis added).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss4/4
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Boyle successfully created a second clearly defined exception to the Missouri
employment-at-will doctrine: at will employees terminated for reporting an
employer's violation of the law as found in a statute or regulation based on a
statute, such as the violation of an FDA regulation, have available a wrongful
discharge cause of action.4
Try again they did. Just several months after Boyle another exception
to the employment-at-will doctrine sprouted in the Eastern District Court of
Appeals. In Beasley v. Affiliated Hospital Products,42 an at will employee
of Affiliated was fired for refusing to fraudulently predetermine the winner of
an advertised raffle of hospital equipment donated by Affiliated.43 The
plaintiff claimed that adherence to his employer's instructions would have
resulted in criminal actions as determined by the Missouri and United States
legislatures." Although emphasizing that "the public policy exception is a
narrow exception to the at will employment doctrine,, 45 the Beasley court
ruled that the plaintiff stated a cause of action for wrongful discharge. 46
Beasley created a third clearly defined exception to the Missouri employmentat-will doctrine: at will employees terminated for refusing to violate the law,
such as state and federal fraud statutes, have available a wrongful discharge
cause of action.47 Just how large of a hole did the Baue, Boyle, Beasley
trilogy bore into employment-at-will?
In 1988, the Missouri Supreme Court addressed that issue in Johnson v.
4" In Johnson,
McDonnell Douglas Corporation.
an employee was terminated
for attending a deposition of a civil suit in which she was a party instead of
going to work.49 At trial, the plaintiff argued her employer had breached an
employment contract formed on the basis of an employee handbook.5" After
the trial court ruled via summary judgment that the employee handbook did
not create an employment contract and the plaintiff was an at will employee,

41. Id. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text for the first exception.
42. 713 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
43. Id.
at 559.
44. Id The plaintiff claimed predetermining a winner would have violated: Mo.
REV. STAT. § 570.140 (1994) (Deceptive Business Practice); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 570.150 (1994) (Commercial Bribery); Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 570.160 (1994) (Bait
Advertising, False Advertising); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994) (Mail Fraud); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343 (1994) (Wire Fraud). Beasley, 713 S.W.2d at 558.
45. Id.
46. Id.
at 561.
47. Id.
48. 745 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1988).
49. Id.
at 662.
50. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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the plaintiff asserted a wrongful discharge action for the first time on
54
5a
52
The plaintiff argued that the Baue, Boyle, and Beasley
appeal.5'
trilogy constitutes a general public policy exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine in Missouri that covered her claim. 55
In rejecting the plaintiffs wrongful discharge claim, the Missouri
Supreme
Court re-emphasized the "continued validity of employment at
56
will,:
Plaintiff asserts ... that she was wrongfully discharged in violation of
public policy. The Court does not deem it necessaryto engrafta so-called
'public policy'exceptiononto the employment at will doctrine. In the cases
cited by plaintiff the employee had the benefit of a constitutional
provision," a statute,5 8 or a regulation based on a statute. . . .9 No
statute, regulation based on a statute, or constitutional provision is
implicated here.6"
The Johnson court kept Baue, Boyle, and Beasley in three separate containers
61
and halted, at least temporarily, the erosion of employment-at-will.

51. Id.at 663. Judge Blackmar of the Missouri Supreme Court argued the
plaintiff might have a valid contract based on an employee handbook and the case
should be remanded for such a determination. See id. at 663-66 (Blackmar, J.,
dissenting).
52. Smith v. Arthur C. Baue Funeral Home, 370 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. 1963). See
supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of Baue.
53. Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). See
supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of Boyle.
54. Beasley v. Affiliated Hosp. Prod., 713 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). See
supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of Beasley.
55. Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Mo. 1988).
56. Id.at 661-62.
57. The plaintiff in Baue had the benefit of a constitutional provision. See Smith
v. Arthur C. Baue Funeral Home, 370 S.W.2d 249, 252-54 (Mo. 1963).
58. The plaintiff in Beasley had the benefit of a statute. See Beasley v. Affiliated
Hosp. Prod., 713 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
59. The plaintiff in Boyle had the benefit of a regulation based on a statute. See
Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 876 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
60. Johnson, 745 S.W.2d at 663 (emphasis added).
61. Two cases following Johnson clearly grasped the conservative message of
Johnson. In Crockett v. Mid-America Health Serv., 780 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989), the plaintiff tried to assert a wrongful discharge claim based on a general public
policy exception. Id.at 658. The court recognized the renewed vitality of the
employment-at-will doctrine in stating what must be pleaded to state a wrongful
discharge action pursuant to the public policy exception:
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss4/4
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Generally speaking, the push towards a broad undefinable public policy
exception confronted rejection. 2 Undeterred, some courts continued to
smudge the clear boundaries of the public policy exception. Johnson became
just another distinguishable case.
For example, in Kirk v. Mercy Hospital Tri-County,63 the Southern
District Court of Appeals discussed a public policy exception in broader terms
than ever before used in Missouri.' The plaintiff in Kirk, a nurse, claimed
she was fired for refusing to violate the Nursing Practice Act when she failed
to "stay out" of a dying patient's improper treatment,65 so she sued her
employer for wrongful discharge based on the public policy exception. 6 The
employer argued that: 1) the Missouri Supreme Court refused to recognize a
general public policy exception in Johnson;67 and 2) the Nursing Practice Act
"does not constitute a clear mandate of law on which a cause of action for
' 68
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy may be based.
The Kirk court interpreted Johnson as a contract case and "not a public
policy exception case" and refused to give Johnson precedential value in a
public policy exception. 9 With Johnson out of the way, the Kirk court

[A]n employee suing under the public policy exception.., must allege and
prove that conduct required of him by the employer would have amounted
to a violation of a statute, constitutional provision or regulation adopted
pursuant to a statute, and also that his discharge was attributable to a refusal
to perform the unlawful act or his performance of a mandated lawful act
contrary to the directions of his employer.
Id. at 658. For another example of the conservative approach to engrafting a public
policy exception, see McCloskey v. Eagleton, 789 S.W.2d 518, 519 (Mo. Ct. App.
1990) ("The Missouri Supreme Court ...has rejected the public policy exception to
the employment-at-will doctrine.")
62. See, e.g., Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Mo.
1988); Dake v. Tuell, 687 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Mo. 1985); Ising v. Barnes Hosp., 674
S.W.2d 623, 625 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
63. 851 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
64. See id. at 619-22.
65. See generallyMo. REV. STAT. §§ 335.011-.096 (1994) (the Nursing Practice
Act). The plaintiff argued, inter alia, "staying out of' the mistreatment of a dying
patient would constitute punishable "incompetency, misconduct, [and] gross
negligence" under the Nursing Practice Act. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 335.066.2 (1994).
66. Kirk, 851 S.W.2d at 618.
67. See id.at 619 (citing Johnson, 745 S.W.2d at 663).
68. Kirk, 851 S.W.2d at 621.
69. Id at 619. It should be noted that the Johnson court exhausted its discussion
of the plaintiff's contract claim before it explicitly shifted its focus to wrongful
discharge. See Johnson, 745 S.W.2d at 663. It was within the wrongful discharge
portion of Johnson that the Missouri Supreme Court stated it did not "deem it
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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freely recognized a general public policy exception that is "itself vague until
applied to the facts of each case."70 In applying the "vague" public policy
exception to the facts at hand, the court was "convinced that the NPA and
regulations thereunder set forth a clear mandate of public policy that Plaintiff
not 'stay out' of a dying patient's improper treatment."'" Kirk made little
attempt to pigeonhole the plaintiff's claim under Baue, Boyle, or Beasley.72
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, in Clark v. Beverly
Enterprises-Missouri,Inc.73 followed the swing in momentum provided by
Kirk. The Clark court broadly stated the boundaries of a Missouri public
policy exception74 and directly attacked the employment-at-will doctrine:
The significance of the public policy exception is that it protects "a myriad"
of employees without the bargaining power to command employment
contracts and are "entitled to a modicum of judicial protection when their
conduct as good citizens is punished by their employers."7
Clark and Kirk stretched Missouri's public policy exception jurisprudence far
from the pro-employment-at-will focus of Johnson.
However, not every post-Johnson public policy exception interpretation
stretched the holding of Johnson like Clark and Kirk. For example, in Lay v.
St. Louis Helicopter Airways, Inc.,76 a helicopter pilot refused to fly
passengers because he believed cold weather rendered the flights too
dangerous.77 His employer lost revenue as a result of the pilot's decision
and, therefore, fired the pilot.78 The pilot sued his employer for wrongful
discharge because the FAA Code of Ethics purportedly required the pilot to
use his "best judgment", which he did; therefore, his termination contravened
public policy. 79 The court conservatively held that the applicable FAA

necessary to engraft a so-called 'public policy' exception onto the employment at will
doctrine.... ." Johnson, 745 S.W.2d at 663. Thus, Kirk unabashedly sidestepped any
and all impediments Johnson placed on the public policy exception.
70. Kirk, 851 S.W.2d at 622.
71. Id. at 622.
72. See id. at 619-22.
73. 872 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
74. See id. at 525.
75. Clark, 872 S.W.2d at 525 (quoting Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods Inc., 427
A.2d 385, 388 (Conn. 1980)) (emphasis added).
76. 869 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
77. Id at 175.
78. Id,
79. Id. at 177.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss4/4
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regulation "imposes no duty on an employer to refrain from terminating a pilot
whose judgment calls are contrary to the employer's judgment." °
Despite cases like Clark and Kirk that smear public policy distinctions,
the law simply is not that unclear.
III. THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION:
WHERE DOES IT ACTUALLY STAND?
Looking back, cases interpreting the nature and scope of the public policy
exception represent a struggle between traditional and progressive thought."'
The Missouri Supreme Court in Baue"2 catalyzed the public policy exception
movement in Missouri when it held at will employees terminated for
exercising a constitutional right, such as appointing a union representative for
collective bargaining purposes, have available a cause of action for wrongful
discharge. 3 Baue did not dismantle employment-at-will.
Over twenty years later, the public policy exception resurfaced and a true
battle began. The courts in Ising v. Barnes Hospitals4 and Dake v. Tuel 8 5
rejected wrongful discharge actions by trumping the public policy exception
with the firmly entrenched employment-at-will doctrine.8 6 Courts responded
in a pro-employee rights manner to the conservative pro-employment-at-will
stances of Ising and Dake.

80. Id.
81. Most Missouri cases interpreting the employment-at-will doctrine demonstrate
a hesitancy to alter the traditional employment-at-will doctrine. See, e.g., Ising v.
Barnes Hosp., 674 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Dake v. Tuell, 687 S.W.2d 191
(Mo. 1985); Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1988).
Other cases demonstrate a complete willingness to abandon traditional interpretation
of employment-at-will via the creation of a broad public policy exception to the
doctrine. See, e.g., Kirk v. Mercy Hosp. Tri-County, 851 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. Ct. App.
1993); Clark v. Beverly Enterprises-Missouri, Inc., 872 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994).
82. 370 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. 1963). For a discussion of Baue, see supranotes 9-14

and accompanying text.
83. Baue, 370 S.W.2d at 253.
84. 674 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). For a discussion of Ising, see supra
notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
85. 687 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. 1985). For a discussion ofDake, see supranotes 23-29
and accompanying text.
86. See Ising v. Barnes Hosp., 674 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Dake
v. Tuell, 687 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Mo. 1985).
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Boyle v. Vista Eyewear87 spearheaded the proliferation of the public
policy exception. The Boyle court muddied public policy exception analysis
by discussing a broad categorical approach advocated in jurisdictions outside
of Missouri, but never adopted in Missouri,88 but rendered a narrowly
tailored holding. An at will employee discharged for reporting violations of
statutory or regulatory law by the employer has a wrongful discharge cause
of action against the employer. 9 Boyle did not dismantle employment-atwill.
Beasley v. Affliated HospitalProducts" continued the pro-public policy
movement after Boyle. Beasley provided another basis for wrongful discharge
in Missouri: an at will employee terminated for refusing to violate statutory
or regulatory law has a wrongful discharge cause of action.9' With two
appellate cases recognizing exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine
within eight months of each other, the flow towards a broad public policy
exception gained momentum. Did the public policy exception trilogy
judicially abrogate employment-at-will?
In 1988, the Missouri Supreme Court said "no" in Johnson v. McDonnell
Douglas Corporation.' The Johnson court refused to recognize that Baue,
Boyle, and Beasley created a broad undefinable public policy exception.93
The Missouri Supreme Court kept separate the three situations that will give
an at will employee a cause of action for wrongful discharge, all based on
retaliatory discharge reasoning.
First, under the Baue line of authority, at will employees terminated for
exercising a constitutional right, such as appointing a union representative for
collective bargaining purposes, have available a wrongful discharge cause of
action.94
Second, under the Boyle line of authority, at will employees terminated
for reporting an employer for violations of statutory or regulatory law have
available a wrongful discharge cause of action.95

87. 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). For a discussion of Boyle, see supra
notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
88. See Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 872-76.
89. Id. at 878.
90. 713 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). For a discussion of Beasley, see supra
notes 42-47 and accompanying text.

91. Beasley, 713 S.W.2d at 561.
92. 745 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1988). For a discussion of Johnson, see supra notes
48-62 and accompanying text.
93. Johnson, 745 S.W.2d at 663.

94. See Smith v. Arthur C. Baue Funeral Home, 370 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. 1963).
95. See Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
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Third, under the Beasley line of authority, at will employees terminated
for refusing to violate statutory or regulatory law have available a wrongful
discharge cause of action.96 Under the Beasley line, refusing to violate FAA
Regulations that require an employee to exercise his "best judgment" is not
enough to give rise to a wrongful discharge claim,97 whereas refusing to
violate the Nursing Practice Act is sufficient.98
After Johnson, appellate courts tried to stretch the narrow wrongful
discharge options of at will employees in cases such as Kirk v. Mercy
Hospital9 and Clark v. Beverly Enterprises-Missouri.10° In Kirk, an at will
employee clearly had a wrongful discharge cause of action under Beasley
because she was terminated for refusing to violate the Nursing Practice Act
and regulations thereunder.'"
Instead of adhering to the limitations of
Johnson 2 by deciding the case narrowly under the Beasley line of
authority, the Kirk court erroneously declined to follow Johnson 3 and held
that the plaintiff in that case had a wrongful discharge claim based on a
general and "vague" public policy exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine." The Clark court also advocated an unnecessarily broad public

96. See Beasley v. Affiliated Hosp. Products, 713 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986).
97. See Lay v. St. Louis Helicopter Airways, Inc., 869 S.W.2d 173, 177 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1993) ("The FAA's regulation concerning a pilot's responsibility and the 'Code
of Ethics' requirement that a pilot use his best judgment are not clear mandates which
allow employee to fall within the public policy exception. Neither imposes a duty on
an employer to refrain from terminating a pilot whose judgment calls are contrary to
the employer's judgment.").
98. See Kirk v. Mercy Hosp. Tri-County, 851 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).

Unlike the situation in Lay, the Nursing Practice Act imposed a duty on the plaintiff
in Kirk that was contrary to her employer's judgment. See id. at 621-23.
99. 851 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). For a discussion of Kirk, see supra
notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
100. 872 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). For a discussion of Clark, see supra
notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
101. See Kirk, 851 S.W.2d at 618.
102. See Johnson, 745 S.W.2d at 663; see also supra notes 48-51 and
accompanying text.
103. The Kirk court determined that Johnson was strictly a contract case and
therefore is not binding in public policy exception cases. Kirk, 851 S.W.2d at 619.
The court's determination is faulty in that the limitations of Johnsondismissed in Kirk

are binding in public policy exception cases because the Johnson court completely
exhausted its contract analysis before discussing the limitations solely within the
wrongful discharge context. See Johnson, 745 S.W.2d at 663.
104. Kirk, 851 S.W.2d at 622.
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policy exception in Missouri when the case could have been decided directly
under Boyle.'
Cases like Kirk and Clark blur the distinctions the Missouri Supreme
Court created regarding the public policy exception; namely, Baue, Boyle, and
Beasley provide the only available wrongful discharge avenues for at will
employees in Missouri. The exception is narrow and should be recognized as
such.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
BY FEDERAL COURTS
Federal courts interpreting the substance of Missouri's public policy
exception recognize the narrow scope of the exception, as mandated by the
Missouri Supreme Court.'" In Link v. K-Mart Corporation°7 an employee
of K-Mart alleged:
In acting as alleged herein defendant K-Mart discharged plaintiff or,
alternatively forced plaintiff to resign, in violation of fundamental public
policies of the State of Missouri, in the following respects among others:
Terminating plaintiff for reporting the illegal acts by supervisory personal
[sic] to-wit: misuses and thefts of company telephone services by manager,
Jim Brunette, merchandise manager W. Kieckhafer, and assistant manager,
Dodson; misuse and theft of merchandise by assistant manager Dodson;
misuse and theft of food merchandise by merchandise manager
Kieckhafer.' 0 '
The court dismissed the plaintiffs claim, and stated: "Vague reference to
'theft' and 'misuse' of K-Mart's own property are insufficient to state a claim
under the 'narrow' public policy exception. " "°9 In order to state an
actionable claim, Missouri law requires the "implication" of specific statutes,
regulations, or constitutional provisions." 0 That is clearly the law.

105. See Clark, 872 S.W.2d at 525.
106. See, e.g., Kosulandich v. Survival Technology, Inc., 997 F.2d 431 (8th Cir.
1993); Stevens v. St. Louis Univ. Med. Ctr., 831 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Mo. 1993); Link
v. K-Mart Corp., 689 F. Supp. 982 (W.D. Mo. 1988). See infra text accompanying
notes 107-122.
107. 689 F. Supp. 982 (W.D. Mo. 1988).
at 983.
108. Id.
109. Id.
at 985.
110. Id.
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In Kosulandich v. Survival Technology, Inc.,"' employees brought
public policy claims alleging they were discharged for filing for
unemployment compensation benefits while they were on lay-off status." 2
As the source of the public policy sought to be vindicated, the plaintiffs cited
statutes which "express a strong policy favoring the availability of
unemployment compensation."". Significantly, the court noted that none
of the statutes cited by plaintiff contain an anti-retaliatory discharge
provision," 4 as can be found in Missouri's Workers' Compensation Act." 5
In holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a wrongful discharge claim based
on the public policy exception, the court found that "[t]he kinds of laws which
the Missouri courts treat as superseding employment at-will are those which
directly forbid employers from taking retaliatory action.""' 6
The Kosulandich court's interpretation of Missouri's public policy
exception is extraordinarily narrow, perhaps too narrow under Missouri law.
According to that court's reasoning, public policy claims are available only
when the legislature rendered a specific category of discharge illegal, but
failed to provide a remedy within the statute. Such reasoning cannot explain
the decision in Boyle, where an employee stated a public policy claim based
on OSHA and FDA regulations which said nothing about retaliatory
discharge.' 7
Likewise, in Stevens v. St. Louis University Medical Center,"' a public
policy claim was dismissed because the plaintiff did not have the benefit of
a statute containing a non-retaliation provision as the source of the claim." 9
In its holding the Stevens court, as compared to the Kosulandich court, more
accurately described when a plaintiff states an actionable public policy claim:
"In the absence of a specific non-retaliation law, a claim for wrongful
discharge may be stated only where an employee is terminatedfor his refusal

111. 997 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1993).
112. Id.
at 432.
113. Id.
at 433. Specifically, the plaintiffs cited two statutes: Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 288.020 (1994) (expressing that Missouri has a strong public policy favoring the
availability of unemployment benefits); Mo. REV. STAT. § 288.380 (1994) (rendering
void purported waivers of unemployment benefits).
114. Kosulandich, 997 F.2d at 433.
115. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.780 (1994) (expressly forbidding retaliatory
discharge against employees filing for workers' compensation benefits).
116. Kosulandich, 997 F.2d at 433 (citing Luethans v. Washington Univ., 838
S.W.2d 117, 120 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)).
117. See Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
118. 831 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Mo. 1993).
119. Id.
at 742.
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to perform an illegal act or because he reported the employer's illegal
acts."'o The only exception not recognized in the Stevens opinion is the
Baue exception pertaining to discharges in contravention of a constitutional
provision.2

The three federal cases discussed above show Missouri's public policy
exception has clearly recognizable boundaries. Federal courts do not seem to
struggle in recognizing such boundaries. However, federal courts coping with
Missouri's public policy exception quietly introduced into Missouri courts a
pre-emption issue that is growing to proportions too significant to ignore.
V. "PRE-EMPTION" OF PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION CLAIMS
Federal courts often deal with public policy exception claims based on
policy set forth in statutory frameworks which contain remedial provisions,
such as Title VII. Such claims raise a peculiar issue not yet addressed by
Missouri state courts: Given the hesitancy of the Missouri Supreme Court to
resort to the public policy exception, should a discharged at will employee
have available a public policy exception claim when the statutory basis for the
claim already provides a remedy or remedies for that employee?
The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri first
addressed this issue in Prewitt v. FactoryMotor Parts,Inc.'22 The plaintiff
in Prewitt was fired for reporting her employer's plan to change the salaries
and working hours of employees reported to the Wage and Hour Division of
the United States Department of Labor."2 She raised two claims relevant
to the pre-emption issue: (1) wrongful discharge under 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA); and (2) wrongful discharge based on
the Missouri public policy exception.'24
The Prewitt court dismissed the plaintiff's public policy exception claim
because the plaintiff had "a complete range of remedies" under the FLSA. 1'25
court relied on the following language in Wehr
In reaching its decision, the
26
v. Burroughs Corporation:

120. Id. (citing Petersimes v. Crane Co., 835 S.W.2d 514, 516-17 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992) ("An at-will employee can be discharged for cause or without cause and the
employer will not be liable for wrongful discharge unless the employee falls within the
protective reach of a contrary statutory provision.")) (emphasis added).
121. See Smith v. Arthur C. Baue Funeral Home, 370 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. 1963).
122. 747 F. Supp. 560 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
123. Id. at 561.
124. Id.

125. Id. at 565 (noting the plaintiff had specific remedies under 29 U.S.C.
§§ 216(b), 217 (1994)).
126. 438 F. Supp. 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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It is clear then that the whole rationale undergirding the public policy

exception is the vindication or the protection of certain strong policies of
the community. If these policies or goals are preserved by other remedies,

then the public policy is sufficiently served. Therefore, application of the
public policy exception requires two factors: (1) that the discharge violate

some well-established public policy; and (2) that there be no remedy to
protect the interests of the aggrievedemployee or society. 27

Thus, "Prewittpre-emption", which focuses on the necessity of a public
policy exception remedy, is nothing more than a cousin to true pre-emption,
which focuses on whether the legislature has occupied a given area of the law.
Prewitt pre-emption does not state that courts cannot, due to separation of
powers principles, recognize a public policy exception remedy; rather, it states
that reliance on public policy to provide a remedy is absolutely unnecessary
where a remedy already exists.' 28 Such an analysis is wholly consistent with
the Missouri Supreme Court's hesitancy to apply a public policy exception to
the employment-at-will doctrine.'29
Just two months after Prewitt, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri applied Prewitt pre-emption. In Gannon v.
Sherwood Medical Company'3 an at will employee arguing she was
terminated due to her age-a violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act-filed a wrongful discharge claim based on the public policy
exception."' The Gannon court noted that the plaintiff had potential claims
under both the Age Discrimination Employment Act and the Missouri
Worker's Compensation Statute,' 32 and because each of the "statutes . . .
contains a remedial provision, the Court conclude[d] that plaintiff's claim for
recovery based on the violation of a public policy evinced by both statutes is
Thus, the plaintiff in Gannon was denied
duplicative and unwarranted."'
recovery under her public policy exception claim.'

127. Prewitt, 747 F. Supp. at 565-66 (quoting Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 438 F.
Supp. 1052, 1055 (E.D. Pa. 1977)) (emphasis added).

128. See id. at 565.
129. See Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Mo. 1988)

(limiting the availability of the public policy exception).
130. 749 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Mo. 1990).
131. Id. at 980.
132. Id. For example, an employee terminated solely in retaliation for filing a
worker's compensation claim has a statutory cause of action under Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 287.780 (1994). See Hansome v. Northwestern Cooperage Co., 679 S.W.2d 273,
275-76 (Mo. 1984).
133. Gannon, 749 F. Supp. at 981.

134. Id.
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Since Prewitt and Gannon, the Prewitt pre-emption reasoning has been
used to dismiss at least three public policy exception claims.'35 The court
in Osborn v. ProfessionalService Industries, Inc. 3 6 rejected a public policy
exception claim because the plaintiff had potential remedies under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, and reasoned as follows:
In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a claim of wrongful termination
based on the public policy exception must be based on a policy which has
no remedy in any statute, regulation, or constitutional provision. It is not
enough to show that a constitutional provision exists which creates a policy
but does not provide a remedy. Plaintiffmust show that no remedyfor that
wrong exists anywhere .... '37
The reason for such a requirement, the court found, is rooted in the
narrowness of the Missouri public policy exception.'
While the federal district courts in Missouri have consistently applied
Prewitt pre-emption, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed the
issue differently, applying true pre-emption analysis.' 39 As discussed below,
the latter could allow a plaintiff to pursue a public policy exception claim
although an alternative statutory remedy in fact exists.
In Schweiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,4 ' the plaintiff brought a
wrongful discharge claim against her employer for exemplary damages based
on Missouri's public policy exception, alleging she was terminated for
reporting Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) violations by her
employer. 4' The employer moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that
plaintiff's "state law wrongful discharge action is pre-empted under both
section 11(c) of [OSHA] . . ., and section 301 of the Labor Management

135. See Kramer v. St. Louis Regional Health Care Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1317,
1318 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (dismissing public policy exception claim because plaintiff had
remedy under the Missouri Human Rights Act and Rehabilitation Act); Wyrick v.
TWA Credit Union, 804 F. Supp. 1176, 1182 (W.D. Mo. 1992) (dismissing public
policy exception claim because plaintiff had potential remedies under Title VII and the
Missouri Human Rights Act); Osbom v. Professional Serv. Indus., Inc., 872 F. Supp.
679, 681 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (dismissing public policy exception claim because plaintiff
had potential remedies under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
136. 872 F. Supp. 679 (W.D. Mo. 1994).
137. Id.
at 681 (emphasis added).
138. Id.
139. It should be noted, the Eighth Circuit has not expressly rejected the Prewitt
line of cases.
140. 922 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1990).
141. Id.
at 473.
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Relations Act. . .. ""'.because those provisions provide the plaintiff with

an administrative retaliatory discharge remedy which does not authorize
exemplary damages.'4 The district court agreed with the employer and
held, "the ability of plaintiffs to pursue retaliatory discharge claims where
available under state law [would] frustrate[] the remedial scheme provided for
in [OSHA] . . ., and thus such state law claims are pre-empted."' 44 In other
words, this issue was addressed as a true pre-emption issue: did Congress
intend for the OSHA administrative remedy to be the sole remedy for this
retaliatory discharge?
The Eighth Circuit disagreed with the district court, holding that Congress
did not intend OSHA to pre-empt all other remedies that permit recovery of
exemplary damages.145 Perhaps Schweiss says pre-emption, including
Prewitt pre-emption, applies only when the statutory scheme provides a full
range of remedies.' 46 Whatever the logic, this holding is significant because
the Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal of a public policy claim based on a
statute containing a retaliatory discharge remedy.
Likewise, in Saffels v. Rice 47 the Eighth Circuit allowed a plaintiff to
pursue a public policy exception claim based on the anti-retaliatory policy of
FLSA concurrently with a FLSA claim, even though FLSA contains a
remedial provision. 4 However, the Saffels opinion indicates that neither
Prewitt pre-emption nor true pre-emption were raised by the employer. 4 9
Nevertheless, Saffels is consistent with Schweiss in that both clearly allowed
employees to proceed with public policy exception claims based on statutes
containing remedies for retaliatory discharge.
Has the Eighth Circuit, via Schweiss and Saffels, rejected Prewitt preemption as a line of defense for employers facing public policy exception
claims? Probably not.
Neither Schweiss nor Saffels truly addressed the Prewitt pre-emption
issue. The Schweiss court addressed true pre-emption, which hinges on
Congressional intent to pre-empt a field of law. Prewitt pre-emption cares
nothing about Congressional intent. Rather, Prewitt pre-emption focuses on

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
Ct. App.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
at 473-74.
Id.
at 474.
Id
Id.
at 476.
See, e.g., Shawcross v. Pyro Products, Inc., 916 S.W.2d 342, 344-46 (Mo.
1995) (interpreting Schweiss as such).
40 F.3d 1546 (8th Cir. 1995).
Id.
at 1550.
Id.
(stating that the employer argued the public policy exception claim should

be dismissed because the employees' "actions do not fall under any of the recognized

categories" for the exception).
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honoring the Missouri Supreme Court's desire to keep the public policy
exception narrow, as it provides for dismissal of public policy exception
claims where public policy is already protected by a statutory remedy. This
distinction is not merely academic. If Schweiss rejected Prewittpre-emption,
the Eighth Circuit certainly would have reversed Wyrick v. TWA Credit
Union 50 and Osborn v. Professional Service Industries Inc.,'5 1 cases
subsequent to Schweiss which dismissed public policy exception claims due
to Prewitt pre-emption.
Saffels also should not affect Prewitt pre-emption because, as mentioned
above, the employer failed to raise the pre-emption issue." 2 Although
Schweiss and Saffels should not render the Prewitt pre-emption argument
invalid, those opinions send a clear message: courts will not consider Prewitt
pre-emption if not raised by the employer. At a minimum, the Eighth Circuit
does not believe that under Missouri law an employee must demonstrate that
no statutory remedies exist to set forth a prima facie public policy exception
claim.
In sum, plaintiffs alleging public policy exception claims based on
statutes containing a full range of remedial provisions will lose those claims
in federal court, provided employers raise Prewitt pre-emption as a defense.
Another major issue with respect to Prewitt pre-emption remains
unresolved: will the Missouri Supreme Court accept it? Prewitt-type cases
often arise in federal courts because they are commonly rooted in federal
statutory frameworks, such as Title VII, OSHA, or FLSA. One state court
case raised, but did not address, a potential Prewitt pre-emption scenario
because the plaintiff did not raise a public policy exception claim.'
Thus,
a very important issue awaits litigation.

150. 804 F. Supp. 1176 (W.D. Mo. 1992).
151. 872 F. Supp. 679 (W.D. Mo. 1994).
152. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
153. In Johnson v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 885 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1994), an
employee of Kraft sued Kraft, alleging that Kraft discharged him because Kraft
received a court order to withhold $450 per month from the employee's pay for
delinquent child support. Id, at 335. A discharge based upon such reasoning violates
Mo. REV. STAT. § 454.505.10 (Supp. 1995), a statute which expressly allows the
division of child support enforcement to force the employer to reinstate the discharged
employee, but says nothing about a private statutory remedy available to that
employee. Id. The employee claimed that the statute should be read as providing him
a statutory cause of action, but the court rejected that argument. Id, at 337. The
employee did not raise a public policy exception claim. Had such a claim been raised,
the court would have had to address "Preivittpre-emption" because the public policy
to be vindicated was contained in a statute containing a remedial provision.
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Another case recognized Prewitt pre-emption in dicta." 4 Finally, the
Eastern District Court of Appeals held that Prewitt pre-emption does apply
where the statutory scheme embodying the public policy violated contains a
full range of remedial provisions.' 55
If the Missouri Supreme Court does not accept the Prewittpre-emption
argument the public policy exception will gain enormous significance. For
example, employees with potential Title VII or FLSA claims can disregard or
negligently fail to comply with administrative remedial requirements without
fear of ultimately losing a remedy. The "narrow" public policy exception
could take the teeth out of many carefully planned statutory frameworks
designed to remedy specific retaliatory discharge situations. Judges rejecting
Prewitt pre-emption essentially will elect themselves to Congress. It simply
should not happen.
VI. CONCLUSION

To what extent has the public policy exception eroded employment-atwill in Missouri? Not much-for now.
State and federal courts alike have devoted much attention to defining the
breadth of the public policy exception. Most courts resisted the legislative
temptation and confined the public policy exception to specific boundaries
within the law. Although some courts try to stretch and distort those
boundaries, the exception remains "narrow" in terms of its categorical
application. But, a new prospect of expansion sneaks through the federal
courts. If the Missouri Supreme Court does not accept Prewitt pre-emption,
a simple discretionary tool created by the Missouri state judiciary could
effectively supplement and sometimes replace complex statutory remedial
mechanisms, such as Title VII and FLSA. The threat is very real.
Today, at will employees might not hold the ultimate trump card to the
employment-at-will doctrine. Today, the discretionary tool forged from the
conscience of the judiciary undermines elaborate legislative schemes. The law
is uncertain; so uncertain that creative plaintiffs' lawyers can create
undefinable causes of action that just might work.
JOSEPH H. KNITTIG

154. See Kirk v. Mercy Hosp. Tri-County, 851 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Mo. Ct. App.

1993).
155. See Shawcross v. Pyro Products, Inc., 916 S.W.2d 342, 344-46 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995), a potentially significant state court decision. To the author's knowledge
this case provides the most persuasive state court authority favoring Prewitt pre-

emption.
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